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Abstract
Besides the simpler ability to interact, open multi-agent systems must include mechanisms for their agents to
reach agreements by taking into account their social context. Argumentation provides multi-agent systems with
a framework that assures a rational communication, which allows agents to reach agreements when conflicts of
opinion arise. In this paper, we present the dialogue protocol that agents of a case-based argumentation framework
can use to interact when they engage in argumentation dialogues. The syntax and semantics of the argumentation
protocol are formalised and discussed. To illustrate our proposal, we have applied the protocol in the context of a
water market. By using our dialogue protocol, agents represent water users that are able to explore different water
allocations and justify their views about what is the best water distribution in a certain environment.
Keywords: Agreement Technologies, Argumentation, Multi-Agent Systems
1. Introduction1
Large scale computer systems can be viewed in terms of the entities that participate in them, offering and2
consuming services (Luck and McBurney, 2008). Open Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), whose software agents are3
able to interact with each other to solve complex tasks and reach agreements as the outcome of their interactions,4
has proven to be a very appropriate paradigm to implement these type of systems (Huhns et al., 2005)(Ossowski,5
2013)(del Val et al., 2014). Furthermore, argumentation theory provides MAS with a framework that assures6
rational communication and allows agents to reach agreements when conflicts of opinion arise. However, agents7
that use an argumentation framework to argue also need a protocol to communicate, to interchange their arguments,8
and to be able to reach agreements.9
Considerable research has been performed on the design of artificial agent communication languages, such as the10
Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML)1 from DARPA, and the Agent Communications Language11
(FIPA ACL)2 from the IEEE Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents. These languages provide agents with high12
flexibility of expression. However, in a dialogue, agents can have too many choices of what to utter in each step13
of the conversation. Therefore, this flexibility can also be an important downside if it gives rise to a state-space14
explosion and leads agents to engage in never-ending dialogues (McBurney and Parsons, 2009, Chapter 13).15
A possible solution for this problem consists of limiting the allowed set of utterances for each step of the dialogue16
by defining the agent communication protocol by means of a dialogue game (Hamblin, 1970)(MacKenzie, 1979).17
Dialogue games are a concept from argumentation theory and game theory that has been applied in MAS to18
structure the dialogue between agents with different points of view. Formal dialogue games are interactions among19
several players (agents in our case) where each player moves by making utterances in accordance with a defined20
set of rules. A wide range of approaches that formalise interaction protocols by using different dialogue games21
have been published (McBurney and Parsons, 2002a).22
However, to our knowledge no research has been done to propose a dialogue game that is based on case-based23
knowledge resources that agents can use to manage agreement processes in agent societies. Reasoning with cases24
is especially suitable where there is a weak (or even unknown) domain theory, but acquiring examples encountered25
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in practice is easy. Many argumentation models for MAS produce arguments by applying a set of inference26
rules (Amgoud et al., 2000)(Augusto and Simari, 2001)(Verheij, 2009). Rule-based systems require eliciting an27
explicit model of the domain (Prakken, 2010). In open MAS, the domain is highly dynamic and the set of rules that28
model it is difficult to specify in advance, even if these rules are domain-specific inference rules that are intended to29
represent domain knowledge. However, tracking the arguments that agents put forward in argumentation processes30
can be relatively simple. Therefore, these arguments can be stored as cases that are codified in a specific case31
representation language that different agents are able to understand (e.g., an ontological language (Jurisica et al.,32
2004)). This approach makes possible to develop case-bases reducing the knowledge-acquisition bottleneck. With33
case-bases, agents are able to perform lazy learning processes on argumentation information. For complex and34
highly dynamic systems, this is easier than using a rule-based system.35
Another important problem with rule-based systems arises when the knowledge-base must be updated (e.g.,36
adding new knowledge that can invalidate the validity of a rule). Updates involve checking the knowledge-base37
for conflicting or redundant rules. Case-based systems are easier to maintain than rule-based systems since, in the38
worst case, the addition of new cases can give rise to updates in some previous cases, but it does not affect the39
correct operation of the system, even though it can have an impact on its performance.40
Therefore, in this paper, we present a dialogue game protocol that agents can use in a case-based argumentation41
framework to interact with each other when they engage in dialogues. This protocol includes a syntax as the set42
of defined locutions that agents can use to engage in argumentation processes, the combinatorial properties of43
locutions, and the rules that govern the dialogue. We also provide the operational semantics of the locutions. This44
semantics views each locution as a transition in an abstract state-machine that represents the possible stages that45
can be reached during the dialogue.46
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces a running example that clarifies the type of47
problems that we want to solve with our argumentation approach; Section 3 briefly introduces our case-based48
argumentation framework for agent societies; Section 4 shows the syntax and operational semantics of the protocol49
and provides a discussion on its properties; Section 5 develops the running example in a dialogue among several50
agents in a water market that is controlled by our protocol; Section 6 analyses related work and compares it with51
our proposal; and Section 7 summarises the contents of this paper.52
2. The Water Market Scenario53
As in human societies, agents in agent societies have a social context that can impose on them a set of norms54
to obey, a preference order regarding a set of values that agents can promote with their actions, and a set of55
dependency relations that link them. By the mere fact of belonging to a group, an agent may have to comply with56
the norms of the group or to act in a way that promotes the values that the group prefers. Similarly, an agent57
that is under contract with another agent to provide it with a service is committed to accepting requests from the58
contracting party that it might never accept otherwise. To clarify this point, let us assume a real scenario where the59
social context of agents has a decisive influence on the agents’ behaviour.60
The example scenario consists of a water market where a society S of agents that represent different users must61
reach an agreement over a water-right transfer. This scenario was introduced in the mWater prototype (Botti et al.,62
2009b)(Botti et al., 2009a)(Botti et al., 2010)(Garrido et al., 2009). Fresh water will be the ”gold” of the 21st63
century (Honey-Roses, 2007). Only 3% of the Earth’s water is salt free. Of that 3%, approximately 2.7% is frozen64
in polar ice caps or deep underground. This leaves only 0.3% of all the water on the planet available for human65
use (Schneider, 1996). Water scarcity is especially problematic in dry climates such as the Mediterranean. Spain66
already suffers from severe water shortages (Honey-Roses, 2007)(Panayotou, 2007). During the last few years, a67
dramatic change in the Spanish Water Law has given rise to many water problems. Spain needs to improve its water68
management in order to meet the needs of different types of users (e.g., farmers, cities, and private companies) and69
to deal with its severe water scarcity problems.70
In this scenario, agents are users of a river basin that can buy or sell their water rights to other agents. A water71
right is a contract with the basin administration authority that specifies the rights that a user has over the water of72
the basin (e.g., the maximum volume that the user can use, the price that the user must pay for the water, or the73
district where the water right is located3). For instance, a particular water right could allow its holder to pump up74
to 10 m3 of water per day during the next cotton season. It is possible to consider both the seller and the buyer as75
3Following the Spanish Water Law, a water right is always associated to a district.
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grouped entities (instead of having only one member playing the role of seller/buyer, a set of members may join76
together to participate in the market on a larger scale). For instance, a given seller has a water right of 2 m3 per day,77
which is clearly insufficient for a buyer that needs 10 m3 of water. If more sellers are grouped together it would78
be possible to have water rights to fit the requirement of the buyer, which analogously can be grouped in a larger79
buyer entity. Now, the stakeholders of this scenario will need to take into consideration the seller/buyer entity and80
model the interactions among the particular members of each entity.81
Our domain scenario assumes that several users are arguing to reach an agreement over a water-right transfer. In82
this scenario, agents can play the following roles (Giret et al., 2010):83
• Water User: a water-right holder of the basin, for instance, a farmer.84
• Buyer: a Water User that wants to transfer its right and or buy a transportation resource.85
• Seller: a Water User that wants to purchase rights and or sell a transportation resource.86
• Third party: a Water User that can be affected by a water-right transfer agreement.87
• Basin regulating authority (Basin Administrator): the Basin Administration representative that can authorize88
a water-right transfer agreement.89
• Jury: the referee entity for problems among the contracting parties and (possibly) third parties of a water-right90
transfer agreement.91
Let us propose a concrete example for this scenario, where two agents that play the role of buyers and represent92
farmers (F1 and F2) in a group (the river basin RB) are arguing to decide over a water-right transfer agreement93
that will grant an offered water right of a farmer F3 playing the role of seller to another farmer. Figure 1 shows a94
graphical representation of this scenario.95
BA
F1 F2
RIVER BASIN RB
ValPref = SO < EC < J
Farmer <Ch Farmer
Farmer <Pow BasinAdministrator
BasinAdministrator
BA
ValPref = SO < EC < J
Farmer F1
ValPref = SO < J < EC
Farmer F2
ValPref = EC < J < SO
F3
F4
Figure 1: Water Market Scenario
Here, a basin administrator (BA) controls the process and makes a final decision. The behaviour of the basin is96
controlled by a certain set of norms NRB. The society commands a charity (Ch) dependency relation between two97
water users (farmers) (Farmer <Ch Farmer) and a power (Pow) dependency relation between an administrator98
(basin administrator), and a buyer (farmer) (Farmer <Pow BasinAdministrator). A power relation of an agent over99
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another agent establishes a hierarchy for them, committing the second agent to accept the orders and requests of100
the first agent. A charity relation establishes a relationship of equality between two agents. Farmers usually prefer101
to reach an agreement before taking legal action in order to avoid the intervention of a jury (J). Also, F1 prefers102
to improve its economy (EC) over the intervention of a jury and this intervention over promoting the solidarity103
between users (SO) (S O < J < EC). F2 prefers solidarity over the intervention of a jury and this over economy104
(EC < J < S O). By default, BA adopts the value preference order of the basin (which promotes saving money in105
each transfer over being supportive of the personal needs of the basin users) and tries to avoid the intervention of106
a jury in any case (S O < EC < J).107
This is a complex scenario that requires an argumentation framework and an underlying dialogue protocol that is108
able to take into account the social context of agents to be able to properly manage the argumentation process. For109
instance, at a certain point of the argumentation dialogue, the BA could put forward an argument that attacks the110
argument that a farmer has brought up to justify that it should be the beneficiary of the water-right transfer. If the111
social context of these agents is not considered, obviously the farmer would try to rebut the attack. However, this112
would violate the norms of the basin, that commits the farmers to accept the arguments of the administrator, even113
if these arguments do not promote the farmers’ preferences. Furthermore, the agent that acts as basin administrator114
could personally prefer the intervention of a jury in spite of taking the responsibility to make a final decision115
about who should be the beneficiary of the transfer. However, as the basin representative, it has to adopt the value116
preference order of the basin and put forward as many arguments as possible to avoid the intervention of a jury in117
the agreement process, which might increase the financial costs of the process. Therefore, agents need to be able118
to engage in an argumentation process in order to reach an agreement on the final beneficiary of the transfer.119
3. Case-based Argumentation Framework120
In the PhD work developed in (Heras, 2011), a case-based argumentation framework that takes into account121
the social context of agents was proposed. Our framework has been implemented as an argumentation API in122
the Magentix2 agent platform, which provides new services and tools that allow for the secure and optimised123
management of open MAS (which is publicly available at http://www.gti-ia.upv.es/sma/tools/magentix2/ ). In this124
section, we briefly introduce the elements of this framework. Specifically, our framework consists of several125
knowledge resources that the agents can use to generate, select, and evaluate arguments following a reasoning126
process to perform these tasks as well as a dialogue protocol that allow agents to reach agreements by performing127
this argumentative reasoning, which is the focus of this paper. The knowledge resources proposed in the framework128
are:129
A database of argumentation schemes with a set of argumentation schemes (Walton et al., 2008), which rep-130
resent stereotyped patterns of common reasoning in the application domain where the framework is imple-131
mented. An argumentation scheme consists of a set of premises and a conclusion that is presumed to follow132
from them. Also, each argumentation scheme has an associated set of critical questions that represent po-133
tential attacks to the conclusion supported by the scheme. The concrete argumentation schemes to be used134
depend on the application domain. For instance, the water-right transfer domain could include a scheme that135
represents a common pattern of reasoning in the agent society S t that the basin administrator follows and that136
changes the value preference order of the basin in case of drought (inspired in Waltons’s argument for an137
exceptional case (Walton et al., 2008)):138
Major Premise: If the case of x is an exception, then the value preference order of the basin can139
be waived and changed by EC <S tRB J <
S t
RB S O in the case of x.140
Minor Premise: The case of drought is an exception.141
Conclusion: Therefore, the value preference order of the basin can be waived and changed by142
EC <S tRB J <
S t
RB S O in the case of drought.143
A case-base with domain-cases that represent previous problems and their solutions. Agents can use this knowl-144
edge resource to generate their positions in a dialogue and arguments to support them. Also, the acquisition145
of new domain-cases increases the knowledge of agents about the domain under discussion. The domain146
case-base of the farmers in our example will store information about previous water-right transfer processes147
and their outcome (who the beneficiary was and under what terms). For instance, let us assume that a farmer148
agent F2 is granted a water-right transfer from its original owner F3 to promote solidarity, since it needs an149
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Table 1: Domain-Case C2
PROBLEM
Owner F3
Volume 225000
Price 0.12
District DF3
Area 18
Drought Yes
SOLUTION
Beneficiary F2
Transferred District DF2
Value Promoted SO
JUSTIFICATION Emergency Drought
urgent irrigation of its land during a drought. The volume of water transferred is of 225.000 liters at a price of150
0.12 Euros per liter and DF3 has an area of 18 acres. Therefore, F2 will store in its case-base the domain-case151
C2 (shown in Table 1) to represent the knowledge gained from this interaction4.152
A case-base with argument-cases that store previous argumentation experiences and their final outcome.153
Argument-cases have three main objectives: they can be used by agents 1) to generate new arguments; 2)154
to strategically select the best position to put forward in view of past argumentation experiences; and 3) to155
store the new argumentation knowledge gained in each agreement process, improving the agents’ argumen-156
tation skills. The case-base of argument-cases of the farmers of the water-right transfer scenario will store157
information about the arguments that these farmers put forward to be selected as beneficiaries of the transfer158
in previous agreement processes. For instance, let us assume that in a new dialogue with the basin admin-159
istrator of a group G, the argument of F2 supporting its candidacy as beneficiary of the transfer F2tr was160
rejected (for instance, since in this river basin economic values prevail over solidarity and the administrator161
prefers to authorize the transfer to another irrigator). Thus, the farmer agent F2 would store in its case-base162
an argument-case representing the knowledge that it has gained about this transaction (see Table 2 for an163
example).164
We use ontologies as the representation language for the knowledge resources of our framework. Specifically, we165
assume that domain-cases are instances of a domain-dependent ontology. Argumentation schemes are represented166
by using the Argument Interchange Format (AIF) ontology, as proposed in (Rahwan et al., 2011). Also, to represent167
argument-cases, we have created a case-based argumentation ontology, called ArgCBROnto5.168
The structure of domain-cases and the specific set of argumentation schemes that an argumentation system that169
implements our framework has depends on the application domain. Argument-cases are the main structure that we170
use to computationally represent arguments in agent societies. In addition, their structure is generic and domain-171
independent. Therefore, in this section, we focus on explaining the argument-case structure. Argument-cases have172
the same three possible types of components that usual cases of CBR systems have: the description of the state of173
the world when the case was stored (Problem); the solution of the case (Conclusion); and the explanation of the174
process that gave rise to this conclusion (Justification). Figure 2 shows the generic structure of an argument-case.175
The problem description has a domain context that consists of the premises that characterise the argument. In176
addition, if we want to store an argument and use it to generate a persuasive argument in the future, the features177
that characterise its social context must also be kept. The social context of the argument-case includes informa-178
tion about the proponent and the opponent of the argument and about their group. Moreover, we also store the179
preferences (ValPref ) of each agent or group over the set of values that are pre-defined in the system. Finally,180
the dependency relation between the proponent’s and the opponent’s roles is also stored. In our framework, we181
consider three types of dependency relations as defined in (Dignum and Weigand, 1995): Power, when an agent182
has to accept a request from another agent because of some pre-defined domination relationship between them;183
Authorisation, when an agent has signed a contract with another agent to provide it with a service and hence, the184
contractor agent is able to impose its authority over the contracted agent, and Charity, when an agent is willing185
4This is based on the example developed in section 5
5The complete specification of the ArgCBROnto ontology can be found at:
http://gti-ia.dsic.upv.es/∼vinglada/docs/Sitio web/ArgCBROnto.html.
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Table 2: Argument-case example
PROBLEM
Domain Context Premises = {owner=F3, volume=225000, .... drought=yes}
Social Context
Proponent
ID = BA
Role = Basin Administrator
Norms = NBA
ValPref = S O <S tBA EC <
S t
BA J
Opponent
ID = F2
Role = Farmer
Norms = NF1
ValPref = EC <S tF1 J <
S t
F1 S O
Group
ID = G
Role = River Basin
Norms = NG
ValPref = S O <S tBA EC <
S t
BA J
Dependency Relation = Power
SOLUTION
Argument Type = Inductive
Conclusion = F2tr
Value = SO
Acceptability State = Unaccepted
Received Attacks
Critical Questions = ∅
Distinguishing Premises = ∅
Counter Examples = ∅
JUSTIFICATION
Cases = {C2}
Argumentation Schemes = ∅
Associated Dialogue Graphs
to answer a request from another agent without being obliged to do so. For instance, as pointed out above, in the186
water-rights transfer scenario, the basin administrator has a power dependency relation over the farmers, while187
they have a charity relation with each other.188
The conclusion of the case, the value promoted, and the acceptability status of the argument at the end of the189
dialogue are stored in the solution part. The acceptability status shows if the argument was deemed acceptable,190
unacceptable, or undecided in view of the other arguments that were put forward in the agreement process. In191
addition, the conclusion part includes information about the possible attacks that the argument received during192
the process. These attacks could represent the justification for an argument to be deemed unacceptable or else193
reinforce the persuasive power of an argument that, despite being attacked, was finally accepted. Specifically,194
arguments in our framework can be attacked by putting forward distinguishing premises or counter-examples to195
them, as proposed in (Bench-Capon and Sartor, 2003), and also by questioning the validity of the conclusion drawn196
from an argumentation scheme by instantiating a critical question.197
Let us assume that we have a set of cases denoted as C, a set of premises denoted as F, a problem to solve198
denoted as P (characterised by a subset of the premises of F), and a function valuec(x) that returns the value of a199
premise x ∈ F in a case c ∈ C.200
Definition 3.1 (Distinguishing Premise). A distinguishing premise x with respect to a problem P between two201
cases c1, c2 ∈ C is defined as: ∃x ∈ c1 ∧ @x ∈ P | ∃x ∈ c2 ∧ valuec1 (x) , valuec2 (x) or else, ∃x ∈ c1 ∧ ∃x ∈202
Pmidvaluec1 (x) = valueP(x) ∧ @x ∈ c2, where P ⊆ F, x ∈ F and c1, c2 ∈ C.203
Otherwise stated: a premise that does not appear in the description of the problem to solve and has different204
values for two cases or a premise that appears in the problem description and does not appear in one of the cases.205
For instance, in our example, if the problem specification does not include a premise that indicates that there is206
drought in the river basin, the premise Drought of C2 can be used by another agent to attack an argument of F2207
that includes C2 as piece of evidence to support F2 position.208
Definition 3.2 (Counter-Example). A counter-example for a case c1 ∈ C with respect to a problem P is another209
case c2 ∈ C such that: acceptable(c2)∧∀xi ∈ c2∩P | valuec2 (xi) = valueP(xi)∧∀xi ∈ c1 | (∃xi ∈ c2∧valuexi (c2) =210
valuexi (c1)) ∧ conclusion(c2) , conclusion(c1)211
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ARGUMENT-CASE
Conclusion
Value
Acceptability Status
SOLUTION
PROBLEM JUSTIFICATION
Dependency Relation
SOCIAL-CONTEXT
Premises
DOMAIN-CONTEXT
ID
Role
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ID
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ID
Role 
ValPref
GROUP
RECEIVED ATTACKS
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PREMISES
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QUESTIONS
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Figure 2: Structure of an Argument-Case
Otherwise stated: a counter-example for a case is a previous case (i.e., domain-case or an argument-case that212
was deemed acceptable), where the problem description of the counter-example matches the current problem to213
solve and also subsumes the problem description of the case, but proposing a different solution. In our example,214
a counter-example for C2 would be another domain-case that represents the situation where a similar transfer (in215
terms of quantity of water, price, land extension, area, etc.) was assigned to another beneficiary.216
Definition 3.3. A critical question is a question associated with an argumentation scheme that represents a poten-217
tial way in which the conclusion drawn from the scheme can be attacked.218
Critical questions can be classified as presumptions that the proponent of the argumentation scheme has made219
or exceptions to the general inference rule that the scheme represents (Prakken et al., 2005). In the case of pre-220
sumptions, the proponent has the burden of proof if the critical question is asked, whereas in the case of the221
exceptions the burden of proof falls on the opponent that has questioned the conclusion of the scheme. Therefore,222
if the opponent asks a critical question, the argument that supports this argumentation scheme remains temporally223
rebutted until the question is conveniently answered. This characteristic of argumentation schemes makes them224
very suitable to devise ways to attack the conclusions drawn from other agents. For instance, in our example the225
argument-scheme presented in this section could include an exception to capture the fact that for a specific river226
basin, the case of drought is not considered as an exception. Therefore, if an agent can provide pieces of evidence227
to rise and justify this exception, the conclusion of the argument-case would be invalidated and the value preference228
order of the associated basin would remain unchanged.229
Finally, the justification part of an argument-case stores the information about the knowledge resources that230
were used to generate the argument represented by the argument-case (the set of domain-cases, argument-cases,231
and argumentation schemes). In addition, the justification of each argument-case has an associated dialogue-232
graph (or several), which represents the dialogue where the argument was proposed. In this way, the sequence of233
arguments that were put forward in a dialogue is represented (storing the complete conversation as a directed graph234
that links argument-cases). This graph can be used later to improve the efficiency in an argumentation dialogue in235
view of a similar dialogue that was held in the past.236
As pointed out above, in our framework, agents can generate arguments from previous cases (domain-cases and237
argument-cases) and from argumentation schemes. However, note that the fact that a proponent agent uses one or238
several knowledge resources to generate an argument does not imply that it has to show all this information to its239
opponent. The argument-cases of the agents’ argumentation systems and the structure of the actual arguments that240
are interchanged among agents is not the same. Thus, arguments that agents interchange are defined as tuples of241
the form:242
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Definition 3.4 (Argument). Arg = {φ, v, {S }}, where φ is the conclusion of the argument, v is the value that the243
agent wants to promote with it, and S is a set of elements that support the argument (support set).244
This support set can consist of different elements, depending on the purpose of the argument. On one hand, if the245
argument provides a potential solution for a problem, the support set is the set of features (premises) that represent246
the context of the domain where the argument has been proposed (those premises that match the problem to solve247
and other extra premises that do not appear in the description of this problem but that have also been considered to248
draw the conclusion of the argument) and, optionally, any knowledge resource used by the proponent to generate249
the argument (domain-cases, argument-cases, or argumentation schemes). Also, a supporting argument promotes250
the value promoted by the position that it justifies. On the other hand, if the argument attacks the argument of251
an opponent, the support set can also include any of the allowed attacks in our framework (critical questions,252
distinguishing premises, or counter-examples). In our framework, we assume that an attack argument promotes the253
value promoted by the position that it tries to defend (if an agent has generated it to rebut an attack on its supporting254
argument) or otherwise, an attack argument promotes the agent’s most preferred value over the set of values that is255
pre-defined in the system (if an agent has generated it to attack the position of other agent).256
For instance, in the water-right transfer domain, Arg = {F2tr, S O, {C2}}, would represent the argument that257
farmer F2 has generated by using its domain-case C2 to justify that it should be the beneficiary of the transfer258
(F2tr) to save his crop in a drought emergency (promoting solidarity (SO)).259
4. Dialogue Game Protocol260
To formalise the protocol that agents use to engage in argumentation processes by using our framework, we261
follow a dialogue game approach. Dialogue games are interactions between two or more players, where each262
player ’moves’ by making statements that follow a pre-defined set of rules (McBurney and Parsons, 2002a). Dia-263
logue games are a specific type of games from game theory that are different from the classical games studied in264
Economics, in the sense that the profits or losses for the victory or defeat are not considered. Another important265
difference is that, in dialogue games, the participants are not able to model the potential moves of other partici-266
pants by using an uncertainty measure, for instance, a probabilistic measure. These characteristics make dialogue267
games a methodology that is suitable for modeling the interactions among heterogeneous agents in a dynamic268
environment.269
Specifically, we follow the dialogue game approach proposed in (McBurney and Parsons, 2002b) and extended270
in (McBurney and Parsons, 2009). This approach is prospective (intended to model systems in order to represent271
reality and that do not exist yet), which fits the objective of most open MAS. Other approaches for formalising272
dialogue systems have been reviewed in (Prakken, 2006) (specifically, formal systems for persuasion dialogue).273
However, most of these proposals are retrospective (intended to reconstruct/explain what happened in a dialogue,274
using a legal dispute as typical example). Furthermore, they assume a consistent and presupposed context that275
represents fixed and indisputable knowledge that cannot be changed during the dialogue. This assumption cannot276
be made in open MAS where heterogeneous agents with partial knowledge about the context of the dispute can277
enter or leave the system (and hence the dialogue) at any time.278
Throughout this paper, we assume that a set of agents with different positions (points of view) are arguing to279
reach an agreement to solve a complex problem. Thus, our basic notion of agreement consists of a solution for a280
generic problem that several agents must solve. At this level of abstraction, we assume that this is a generic problem281
of any type (e.g., resource allocation, classification, prediction, etc.) that could be described with a set of features.282
However, different notions of agreement can be found in the literature of agreement technologies (Carrascosa and283
Rebollo, 2009). First, we introduce the notation that we use in defining the protocol. Subsequently, the protocol284
syntax and semantics are presented. Finally, we provide a discussion on the protocol properties.285
4.1. Notation286
In our dialogue protocol we follow the standard that views utterances as composed by two layers: an internal287
layer that represents the topics of the dialogue and an external layer that consists of the locutions or performatives288
that define the allowed speech acts. On one hand, we assume that the topics of the inner layer can be represented289
with well-formed formulae of the Description Logic (DL) SHOIN(D) (Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2004),290
which forms the basis of the Web Ontology Language OWL-DL. As pointed out above, we have designed an291
ontology called ArgCBROnto to define the representation language of arguments and argumentation concepts.292
Ontologies provide a common vocabulary to understand the structure of information among different software293
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agents. In addition, ontologies allow assumptions about the domain to be made explicit, which facilitates to change294
these assumptions as new knowledge about the domain is acquired. The high dynamism of the domains where open295
MAS operate gives rise to many changes in the domain knowledge that agents have available. Therefore, they must296
be able to efficiently handle the consequences of these changes. On the other hand, we use the standard operators297
and axioms of modal logics of knowledge and belief (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, Chapter 13) to define the298
semantics of locutions.299
In DLs, the important notions of the domain are described by concept descriptions, which are expressions that300
are built from atomic concepts (unary predicates) and atomic roles (binary predicates relating concepts) using the301
concept and role constructors provided by the specific DL. The semantics of DLs is given in terms of interpretations302
(Baader et al., 2007). Table 3 shows the syntax and semantics of the constructors of SHOIN(D), using Roman303
upper-case letters to represent concepts, datatypes, and roles and Roman lower-case letters to represent individuals304
and data values.305
Table 3: Syntax and Semantics of SHOIN(D) (Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 2004).
Constructor Name Syntax Semantics
atomic concept A A AI ⊆ ∆I
datatypes D D DD ⊆ ∆ID
abstrac role RA R RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I
datatype role RD U UI ⊆ ∆I × ∆ID
individuals I o oI ∈ ∆I
data values v vI = vD
inverse role R− (R−)I = (RI)−
conjunction C1 uC2 (C1 uC2)I = CI1 ∩CI2
disjunction C1 unionsqC2 (C1 unionsqC2)I = CI1 ∪CI2
negation ¬C1 (¬C1)I = ∆I \CI1
oneOf {o1, ...} {o1, ...}I = {oI1 , ...}
exists restriction ∃R.C (∃R.C)I = {x|∃y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ RI and y ∈ CI}
value restriction ∀R.C (∀R.C)I = {x|∀y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}
atleast restriction ≥ nR (≥ nR)I = {x|#({y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ RI}) ≥ n}
atmost restriction ≤ nR (≤ nR)I = {x|#({y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ RI}) ≤ n}
datatype exists ∃U.D (∃U.D)I = {x|∃y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ UI and y ∈ DD}
datatype value ∀U.D (∀U.D)I = {x|∀y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ UI → y ∈ DD}
datatype atleast ≥ nU (≥ nU)I = {x|#({y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ UI}) ≥ n}
datatype atmost ≤ nU (≤ nU)I = {x|#({y. 〈x, y〉 ∈ UI}) ≤ n}
datatype oneOf {v1, ...} {v1, ...}I = {vI1 , ...}
Axiom Name Syntax Semantics
concept inclusion C1 v C2 CI1 ⊆ CI2
object role inclusion R1 v R2 RI1 ⊆ RI2
object role transitivity Trans(R) RI = (RI)+
datatype role inclusion U1 v U2 UI1 ⊆ UI2
individual inclusion7 a : C aI ∈ CI
individual equality a = b aI = bI
individual inequality a , b aI , bI
concept existence ∃C #(CI) ≥ 1
Like description logic, SHOIN(D) uses concept descriptions to build statements in a DL knowledge baseK (the306
analogue of an ontology in OWL-DL), which typically comes in two parts: terminological (TBox), and assertional307
(ABox). In the TBox, we can describe the relevant notions of an application domain by stating properties of308
concepts and roles and relationships between them. For instance, the notions of agents and arguments are defined309
in our argumentation framework with the concepts of Agent and Argument of the ArgCBROnto and the following310
axioms:311
S ocialEntity v Thing312
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Agent v S ocialEntity313
Argument v Thing314
The properties of an argument are defined with the roles hasConclusion, promotesValue, and hasS upportS et315
and the following axioms and value restrictions:316
Argument v ∀hasConclusion.Conclusion317
Argument v ∀promotesValue.Value318
Argument v ∀hasS upportS et.S upportS et319
which state that arguments can have three properties that relate them to objects of the class Conclusion, Value,320
and S upportS et. Correspondingly, the ABox represents the concrete data of the database K , with the individuals321
of concepts (instances) and their properties. For instance, the ABox of the ArgCBROnto ontology can include an322
argument arg that promotes a value solidarity:323
Argument(arg)324
promotesValue(arg, solidarity)325
On the other hand, the syntax of the external layer of utterances (locutions) is the same syntax as proposed in326
(McBurney and Parsons, 2004):327
locution(as, φ) or locution(as, ar, φ)328
where Agent(as) (the sender) and Agent(ar) (the receiver) are individuals of the Agent concept and φ is the329
content of the utterance. The first locution is addressed to all participants in the dialogue, whereas the second is330
specifically sent to Agent(ar). We denote the set of well-formed formulae in SHOIN(D) as D. Then, φ ∈ D can331
represent statements about problems to solve, evidence about the world, or different types of arguments. Also,332
we denote the set of individuals members of the concept Argument as A such that ∀arg ∈ A, Argument(arg).333
Therefore, Φ is said to be an argument in support of φ if Φ ∈ A/Φ `+ φ. Correspondingly, Φ is said to be an334
argument against φ if Φ ∈ A/Φ `− φ.335
Also, agents make propositional commitments (also known as dialogical commitments) with each locution that336
they put forward. Therefore, if an agent asserts a locution and another agent challenges it, the first agent has the337
commitment to provide reasons (or arguments) to justify the validity of that assertion or else, it has to retract it.338
All commitments made by an agent during the dialogue are commonly stored in an individual database called339
commitment store (CS) (Hamblin, 1970) (there is one commitment store per agent), which is accessible by other340
agents that are engaged in a dialogue with the agent.341
As pointed out above, we follow the standard notation of modal logics of knowledge and belief described in342
(Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, paper 13). Thus, we use the modal operators343
Kiφ: “Agent ai knows φ”344
Biφ: “Agent ai believes that φ is true”345
Cgφ: “φ is common knowledge for any agent in the group g if any agent of the group knows it and knows that it346
is common knowledge”347
and the modal connective348
♦φ is satisfied now if φ is satisfied either now or at some future moment.349
Note that here we make a distinction between what agents know (which is considered to be true) and what agents350
believe (which forms part of the mental state of an agent and may be true or not). For instance, all farmers351
that belong to the river basin society of our example know that the basin administrator believes that avoiding the352
intervention of a jury will save costs in the water-right transfer process. The farmers know what the administrator353
believes. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the basin administrator’s opinion is appropriate and, in354
fact, any farmer can believe that promoting other values may be more appropriate. Therefore, the opinion of the355
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administrator is subjective and depends on its knowledge; however due to the administrator’s power dependency356
relation over farmers, the farmers have to accept the administrator’s point of view.357
In addition, as proposed in (McBurney and Parsons, 2004), we use the following simplified elements of FIPA’s358
communicative act library specification8:359
Done[locution(as, φ), preconditions]360
which indicates that locution(as, φ) (or correspondingly locution(as, ar, φ)) has been put forward by agent as (ad-361
dressed to agent(s) ar) with content φ and that the specified preconditions hold before this utterance and362
Feasible[condition, locution(as, φ)]363
which means that if condition can take place, locution(as, φ) (or correspondingly locution(as, ar, φ)) will be put364
forward by agent as (addressed to agent(s) ar) with content φ.365
Further notation that we use throughout this paper includes the following:366
as: the Agent(as) sender of the locution.367
ar: the Agent(ar) receiver of the locution.368
argi: an Argument(argi) of an Agent(ai).369
S S i: the S upportS et(S S i) of the Argument(argi) that has put forward an Agent(ai).370
CS i: the commitment store of an Agent(ai).371
q: the Problem(q) under discussion.372
pi: the S olution(pi) (or position) proposed by an Agent(ai) to solve the Problem(q).373
4.2. Protocol Syntax374
In this section, we provide the syntax of the communication protocol that the agents of our argumentation frame-375
work follow. Therefore, we present the elements of the dialogue: the set of allowed locutions, the commencement376
rules, the combination rules that govern the course of the dialogue, the commitment rules that define the commit-377
ments that each agent makes when it utters each locution and how these commitments can be combined, the rules378
for speaker order, and the termination rules. The dialogue game presented in this section is aimed at providing a379
communication protocol for agents that engage in an agreement process. This process can be viewed from several380
perspectives: as a collaborative deliberation, where all agents select the best solution for a problem at hand and381
do not perceive any reinforcement or reward if their position is selected as the final solution to be applied; as a ne-382
gotiation, where agents try to convince other agents to apply their solution as the best one for solving the problem383
(with individual utility functions that increase their perceived utility); or as a persuasion, where each agent tries384
to persuade the rest of the agents to change their opinions and support its solution as the best option to solve the385
problem.386
Locutions387
The set of allowed locutions of our dialogue game are the following:388
• L1: open dialogue(as, φ), where φ is a problem q to solve in the system application domain. With this389
locution, an agent as opens the argumentation dialogue, asking other agents to collaborate or negotiate to390
solve a problem that the agent has been presented with.391
• L2: enter dialogue(as, φ), where φ is a problem q to solve in the system application domain. With this392
locution, an agent as engages in the argumentation dialogue to solve the problem.393
• L3: withdraw dialogue(as, φ), where φ is a problem q to solve in the system application domain. With this394
locution, an agent as leaves the argumentation dialogue to solve the problem.395
8http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00037/SC00037J.html
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• L4: propose(as, φ), where φ is a position p. With this locution, an agent as puts forward the position p as its396
proposed solution to solve the problem under discussion in the argumentation dialogue.397
• L5: why(as, ar, φ), where φ can be a position p or an argument arg ∈ A. With this locution, an agent as398
challenges the position p or the argument arg of an agent ar, asking it for a supporting argument.399
• L6: noCommit(as, φ), where φ is a position p. With this locution, an agent as withdraws its position p as a400
solution for the problem under discussion in the argumentation dialogue.401
• L7: assert(as, ar, φ), where φ can be an argument arg ∈ A that supports a position, another argument, or an402
objectively verifiable evidence about the system application domain. With this locution, an agent as sends403
to an agent ar an argument or an evidence that supports its position or a previous argument that ar has put404
forward.405
• L8: accept(as, ar, φ), where φ can be an argument arg ∈ A or a position p to solve a problem. With this406
locution, an agent as accepts the argument arg or the position p of an agent ar. Also, this locution can be407
used at the end of the dialogue to inform all agents about the final position agreed upon as the best position408
to solve the problem. In that case, ar denotes all individuals that belong to the concept Agent, except for the409
sender as (all : ∀ai, ai , as/Agent(ai)).410
• L9: attack(as, ar, φ), where φ is an argument arg ∈ A of an agent as. With this locution, an agent as411
challenges an argument of an agent ar with its argument arg.412
• L10: retract(as, ar, φ), where φ is an argument arg ∈ A. With this locution, an agent as informs an agent ar413
that it withdraws the argument arg that it put forward in a previous step of the argumentation dialogue.414
Commencement Rules415
The dialogue starts when an agent as is presented with a new problem q to solve. First, the agent tries to solve416
it by using its own knowledge resources. Then, it opens a dialogue with other agents by sending them the locution417
open dialogue(as, ar, q), where ar can be any agent ai that as knows. After that, ai enters in the dialogue by posing418
the locution enter dialogue(as, q) (where as = ai). After that, if ai has been able to find a solution for q, it proposes419
this initial position p to solve the problem q with the locution propose(as, p) (where as = ai) and waits for the420
challenges of other agents or for other position proposals. Otherwise, ai can challenge the positions of other agents421
engaged in the dialogue with the locution why(as, ar, p) (where as = ai).422
Rules for the Combination of Locutions423
The rules for the combination of locutions define which locution can be put forward at each step of the dialogue424
game. Figure 3 represents a state machine with the possible stages of our dialogue game protocol. As shown in425
the figure, the protocol has three main stages: the opening stage, where the agent that initiates the dialogue opens426
the argumentation process to solve a problem; the argumentation stage, where agents argue to reach an agreement427
about the best solution to apply to solve the problem; and the closing stage, where the final decision about the428
position selected to solve the problem is reported to all agents that have participated in the dialogue. The stages of429
our dialogue game and the rules for the combination of locutions in each stage are presented below.430
open_dialogue(as, q) accept(as, all, p)OPENING
STAGE
ARGUMENTATION
STAGE
CLOSING
STAGE
Figure 3: State Machine of the Dialogue Game
Opening Stage:431
The opening stage commences when an agent as wants to establish an agreement process with other agents432
to solve a problem q that it has been faced with. Then, it uses the locution open dialogue(as, q) to start the dialogue.433
434
Argumentation Stage:435
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
R7
withdraw_dialogue(as, q)
propose(as, p)
withdraw_dialogue(aj, q)
why(as,ar, p)
noCommit(as, p)
assert(as, ar, arg)
accept(as, ar, arg)
attack(as, ar, arg) 
retract(as, ar, arg)
assert(as, ar, arg)/
[arg = CQ ∧
CQ.type = presumption]
why(as,ar, arg)/
[arg = CQ ∧
CQ.type = exception]
retract(as, ar, arg)
R8
assert(as, ar, arg)
retract(as, ar, arg)
attack(as, ar, arg) /
 [arg = DP ∨ CE]
enter_dialogue(as, q)
attack(as, ar, arg)
accept(as, ar, p)
noCommit(as, p)
retract(as, ar, arg)
retract(as, ar, arg)
why(as,ar, p)
Figure 4: State Machine of the Argumentation Stage
The argumentation stage follows the opening stage. Here, agents argue to reach an agreement about the solution436
to apply to the problem q. As shown in Figure 4, this stage is divided into a set of substages whose activation is437
defined by the following rules (for reasons of clarity, substages are labelled with the name of the rule that applies438
in each case):439
• R1: Once the dialogue has been opened, any agent that has been informed about it can enter in by using the440
locution enter dialogue(as, q).441
• R2: After entering the dialogue, an agent can propose its position p to solve the problem q by putting forward442
the locution propose(as, p). Alternatively, the agent can challenge the positions of other agents engaged in443
the dialogue (without its own position being proposed) with the locution why(as, ar, p). Also, in this substage,444
the agent can withdraw from the dialogue by using the locution withdraw dialogue(as, q).445
• R3: In this substage, an agent that has proposed its position p to solve the problem q can be asked by another446
agent for an argument to support this position with the locution why(as, ar, p). Also, p can be accepted by an447
agent engaged in the dialogue, who reports to the proponent agent with the locution accept(as, ar, p). Fur-448
thermore, the proponent agent can withdraw its position p with the locution noCommit(as, p). Alternatively,449
it can leave the dialogue with the locution withdraw dialogue(as, q).450
• R4: After being asked for an argument to support its position p, an agent can use its knowledge resources to451
provide the requester agent with this argument arg by means of the locution assert(as, ar, arg). Alternatively,452
it can withdraw its position p by using the locution noCommit(as, p).453
• R5: An agent that has received a support or an attack argument from another agent can use its knowledge454
resources to create an attack argument arg and send it to the other agent with the locution attack(as, ar, arg).455
Also, the agent can accept the supporting argument and report to the other agent with the locution456
accept(as, ar, arg), where arg is the supporting argument received. In its turn, an agent that has asserted457
the argument arg can withdraw it with the locution retract(as, ar, arg).458
• R6: When an agent receives an attack argument from another agent, it analyses the type of the attack and459
can use its knowledge resources to try to rebut the attack. Therefore, if the attacking argument arg was a460
distinguishing premise or a counter-example (arg = (DP ∨ CE)), the agent can distinguish the argument461
of the other agent with other distinguishing premise or else counter-attack with another counter-example by462
using the locution attack(as, ar, arg). If the attacking argument was a critical question of the type presumption463
(arg = CQ∧CQ.type = presumption), the agent can use its knowledge resources to create and show the other464
agent an argument arg with evidence that supports that presumption by using the locution assert(as, ar, arg).465
Finally, if the attacking argument was a critical question of the type exception (arg = CQ ∧ CQ.type =466
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exception), the agent can ask the other agent for an argument to support this critical question by stating the467
locution why(as, ar, arg). Alternatively, if the agent cannot rebut the attack, it can retract its argument with468
the locution retract(as, ar, arg). In its turn, any agent that has asserted the argument arg can withdraw it with469
the locution retract(as, ar, arg).470
• R7: If an agent is asked by another agent to provide a supporting argument for its critical question of the type471
exception, this agent must use the locution assert(as, ar, arg) to assert an argument arg with evidence to sup-472
port this critical question attack or else retract the attack by putting forward the locution retract(as, ar, arg).473
• R8: Once an agent has been provided by another agent with evidence that supports the other agent’s critical474
question of the type exception, the fist agent can retract its argument arg and report to the other agent with the475
locution retract(as, ar, arg) or else can try to generate an attack argument arg for the other agent’s argument476
and send it the locution attack(as, ar, arg).477
Also, note that any agent can withdraw its position at any stage of the dialogue. It implies that there is a transaction478
labelled with the locution noCommit(as, p) from substages R5...R8 to substage R2. However, these substages do479
not appear in Figure 4 for reasons of clarity.480
481
Closing Stage:482
The closing stage can be activated at any time in the dialogue by the agent ai that opened it. This stage is reached483
by putting forward the locution accept(as, all, p) (where as = ai), which informs all the participating agents about484
the final position p agreed upon as the solution for the problem q. Here, the commitment store of all agents is485
deleted.486
Commitment Rules487
As pointed out above, agents make dialogical commitments with each locution that they put forward. These488
commitments are stored in an individual commitment database called commitment store (CS). Also, the inclu-489
sion of a new commitment in the commitment store can make previous commitments be inconsistent or invalid.490
The commitment rules that define the commitments associated with each locution and how their inclusion in the491
commitment store affects previous commitments are presented below.492
• CR1: The locution enter dialogue(as, q) gives rise to the creation of the commitment store CS s of the sender493
agent.494
• CR2: The locution propose(as, p) inserts the position p into the commitment store CS s of the sender agent.495
If there is a previous position in CS s, this position is replaced with the new position p. Thus, only one position496
can prevail in any commitment store.497
• CR3: The locution withdraw dialogue(as, q) deletes the commitment store CS s of the sender agent. This498
implies that the final agreement is only taken among the agents that remain listening in the substages R2 or499
R3. Also, agents cannot withdraw the dialogue before withdrawing any position that they have proposed with500
the locution noCommit(as, p).501
• CR4: The locution accept(as, ar, p) inserts the position p into the commitment store CS s of the sender. If502
there is a previous position in CS s, this position is replaced with the new position p.503
• CR5: The locution noCommit(as, p) deletes p from the commitment store CS s of the sender.504
• CR6: The locution why(as, ar, p) commits the receiver to provide the sender with a supporting argument arg505
for p or else to withdraw p with the locution noCommit(as, p).506
• CR7: The locution assert(as, ar, arg) inserts the argument arg in the commitment store CS s of the sender.507
Also, commitment stores cannot have inconsistent arguments. Therefore, if the conclusion of arg con-508
tradicts the conclusion of a previous argument stored in CS s, the sender cannot put forward the locution509
assert(as, ar, arg) before deleting the inconsistent argument from CS s with the locution retract(as, ar, arg) ad-510
dressed to any agent that is maintaining a dialogue with the sender. Furthermore, if arg includes in its support511
set an argumentation scheme with a critical question of the type presumption, the locution assert(as, ar, arg)512
commits the sender to provide evidence to support this argument if another agent attacks it with the locution513
attack(as, ar, arg), where arg includes such critical question, or else to retract the argument.514
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• CR8: The locution accept(as, ar, arg) inserts the argument arg into the commitment store CS s of the sender.515
Again, commitment stores cannot have inconsistent arguments. Therefore, if the conclusion of arg contradicts516
the conclusion of a previous argument stored in CS s, the sender cannot put forward the locution assert(as, ar,517
arg) before deleting the inconsistent argument from CS s with the locution retract(as, ar, arg) addressed to518
any agent that is maintaining a dialogue with the sender.519
• CR9: The locution retract(a j, ak, arg) deletes the argument arg from the commitment store CS j of a j.520
• CR10: The locution attack(as, ar, arg) inserts the argument arg in the commitment store CS s of the sender.521
As pointed out above, commitment stores cannot have inconsistent arguments. Therefore, if the conclu-522
sion of arg contradicts the conclusion of a previous argument stored in CS s, the sender cannot put for-523
ward the locution attack(as, ar, arg) before deleting the inconsistent argument from CS s with the locution524
retract(as, ar, arg) addressed to any agent that is maintaining a dialogue with the sender. Also, if arg includes525
an argumentation scheme with a critical question of the type exception, the locution attack(as, ar, arg) com-526
mits the sender to provide an evidence to support this attack if another agent challenges this exception with527
the locution why(as, ar, arg), or else to retract it.528
• CR11: The locution accept(as, all, p) (all : ∀ai, ai , as | Agent(ai)) deletes the commitment stores of all529
agents that are still participating in the dialogue (including the initiator). This is a special case of commitment530
rule that grants the initiator to manage the commitment stores of other agents and ensures an ordered termi-531
nation of the dialogue. Thus, we assume the existence of a normative level that all participants agree upon532
before they are able to enter in the dialogue.533
Rules for Speaker Order534
During the dialogue, agents take turns putting forward locutions. Each time an agent as sends a locution to535
another agent ar, it waits for an answer from ar. However, any agent can hold parallel argumentation dialogues536
with several agents. Thus, in each of these dialogues, the argumentation succeeds as a two-party dialogue between537
two agents, one agent sending a locution to the other agent and waiting for a response. Nevertheless, the locution538
open dialogue(as, q) is received by all agents of the society S t. The locutions accept(as, all, p), propose(as, p),539
noCommit(as, p) and withdraw dialogue(as, p) are received by all of the agents that are engaged in the dialogue.540
With these locutions, the sender agent does not expect any response.541
In this dialogue game protocol, we assume that all participating agents can always see the positions of the other542
agents by looking at their commitment stores. Also, when two agents are engaged in a dialogue, each agent has full543
view to the commitment store of the other agent. In this way, these agents can see the commitments associated to544
the arguments of their partners, but other agents can only see to the positions proposed by each agent in the dialogue545
(which are also stored in the commitment stores). This preserves the privacy of the arguments that an agent puts546
forward in its argumentation dialogue with another agent. Note that if an agent wants to ask other agents for an547
opinion about an argument that it has received, it simply has to send those agents the argument, as if the argument548
was its own. This simple rule allows us to use the same dialogue game to govern collaborative deliberations,549
persuasion dialogues, and negotiations. In the collaborative deliberations, all agents follow the common objective550
of proposing the best solution for a problem at hand. Therefore, there are no agents interested in trying to take551
advantage of the information interchanged between other agents to obtain a greater benefit with the final agreement552
reached. However, this could be the case in a persuasion or a negotiation, where each agent tries to persuade other553
agents to change their point of view or tries to increase its perceived utility value with the final agreement, thereby554
using any extra information about other agents’ knowledge and preferences in order to achieve that.555
Termination Rules556
The normal termination of the dialogue occurs when the argumentation process ends with all participating agents557
having proposed a prevailing position or having accepted the position of another agent. Then, agents may reach558
a decision about the final solution for the problem under discussion. In the ideal case, only the position of one559
participating agent prevails, while the other agents have withdrawn theirs and accepted this position by using560
the locution accept(as, ar, p). However, if at the end of the dialogue more than one position is still undefeated,561
agents can use a voting mechanism (selecting the position most accepted) or a random selection to decide the final562
outcome of the agreement process.563
In any case, the agent ai that opened the dialogue is responsible for reporting to all participating agents the final564
position p that has been selected as solution for the problem q at hand, by using the locution accept(as, all, p)565
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(where as = ai). To avoid infinite dialogues, agents cannot put forward the same argument twice during a dia-566
logue with another agent, unless new pieces of evidence are available. Furthermore, a maximum time to reach an567
agreement can be established and agents must accept a position among those available at that moment to solve the568
problem.569
Note that agents can maintain several parallel dialogues with other agents. Thus, once an agent has entered in the570
argumentation process with the locution enter dialogue(as, q), it remains waiting to propose a position in substage571
R2 or listening to incoming locutions of other agents in substage R3. Then, the specific dialogue with an agent that572
has asked another agent for a supporting argument for its position p continues the subsequent substages, but the573
agent still remains in R3 listening to other requests. Finally, the locution noCommit(as, p) commits the sender to574
terminate any dialogue that it has started to defend p.575
4.3. Semantics576
In this section, we provide the formal semantics for the locutions of our dialogue game protocol. This semantics577
provides a common understanding about the properties of the communication language between agents. There578
are different methods for providing a communication language with a semantics (Tennent, 1991), for instance, the579
operational approach followed in this paper.580
Operational semantics views the dialogue game protocol as an abstract state machine and precisely defines the581
transitions between states. These transitions are triggered by the utterance of each locution. However, from some582
stages, an agent can utter different locutions following different agent decision mechanisms, which are reasoning583
mechanisms that agents can use to choose the locution to utter in the next step of the dialogue among a set of584
candidates. These mechanisms depend on the knowledge that agents can infer from their knowledge resources or585
even on the specific design of agents. For instance, agents that are designed to be more competitive and, if possible,586
always put forward attack arguments or agents that are designed to remain listening and only engage in a dialogue587
if their positions or arguments are attacked. Figure 5 shows the decision mechanisms that agents can use in each588
substage of the argumentation stage of our protocol. For purposes of clarity , the arrows labelled with the decision589
mechanism D8 (presented below) from substages R5, R6, R7, and R8 to substage R2 are omitted in the figure.590
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
R7
D3: withdraw_dialogue(as, q)
D4: propose(as, p)
D3: withdraw_dialogue(aj, q)
D5: why(as,ar, p)
D6: noCommit(as, p)
D6: assert(as, ar, arg)
D9: accept(as, ar, arg)
D9: attack(as, ar, arg) 
D13: retract(as, ar, arg)
D11: assert(as, ar, arg)/
[arg = CQ ∧
CQ.type = presumption]
D11: why(as,ar, arg)/
[arg = CQ ∧
CQ.type = exception]
D11: retract(as, ar, arg)
R8
D12: assert(as, ar, arg)
D12: retract(as, ar, arg)
D11: attack(as, ar, arg) /
 [arg = DP ∨ CE]
D2: enter_dialogue(as, q)
D13: attack(as, ar, arg)
D5: accept(as, ar, p)
D8: noCommit(as, p)
D7: retract(as, ar, arg)
D10: retract(as, ar, arg)
D4: why(as,ar, p)
D1: open_dialogue(as, q)
D12: close_dialogue(as, all, p)
Figure 5: Decision Mechanisms of the Dialogue Game
To define the transition rules of our protocol we follow the notation of (McBurney and Parsons, 2004):591
〈ai,K, o〉592
where ai is an agent, K is a decision mechanism (or the terminal state T ), and o is the output of the mechanism K593
(send a locution or remain listening to incoming locutions). Some transitions are labelled with the locutions that594
trigger them while others (which occur between the mechanisms of a single agent) remain unlabeled. Also, if no595
specific output is invoked, we denote this by a period in the third parameter of the triple (〈ai,K, .〉).596
Specifically, we have identified the following decision mechanisms:597
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• D1 Open Dialogue: A mechanism that allows an agent to open a dialogue with other agents of the society598
S t that the agent belongs to, by uttering or not uttering the locution open dialogue(as, q). The output of this599
mechanism is: send(open dialogue(as, φ)).600
• D2 Enter or Close Dialogue: A mechanism that allows an agent to decide to engage in a dialogue and utter601
or not utter the locution enter dialogue(as, q). By this mechanism, the agent makes a query to its knowledge602
resources, trying to find a solution for the problem to solve. If the agent can provide a solution for the problem,603
the agent uses the mechanism to decide whether or not it enters in the dialogue. Alternatively, the agent that604
started the dialogue can also close it with the locution accept(as, all, p). The outputs of this mechanism are:605
send(enter dialogue(as, φ)), listen(), or send(close dialogue(as, all, φ)).606
• D3 Withdraw from Dialogue: A mechanism that allows an agent to withdraw from the dialogue and put607
forward the locution withdraw dialogue(as, q). The mechanism first checks that the agent does not have any608
active position to solve the problem (agents cannot withdraw from the dialogue before withdrawing their609
positions). Possible outputs are: send(withdraw dialogue(as, φ)).610
• D4 Propose or Challenge: A mechanism that allows an agent to make a proposal to solve the problem under611
discussion and utter the locution propose(as, p) or to challenge the positions of other agents by uttering the612
locution why(as, ar, p). By this mechanism the agent uses its knowledge resources to generate and select613
the position to propose. If the agent has been able to generate a position to solve the problem, it uses the614
mechanism to decide whether to put forward that position. In any case, the agent can challenge other positions615
or remain listening to the utterances of other agents. The outcomes for this mechanism are: send(propose(as,616
φ)), send(why(as, ar, φ)), or listen().617
• D5 Accept or Challenge: A mechanism that allows an agent to query its knowledge resources and decide618
to accept or challenge the position of another agent. If the agent is able to generate the same position as its619
candidate to solve the problem, it can utter the locution accept(as, ar, p) to accept the other’s position. Else, if620
the position cannot be generated or is generated but not ranked as the most suitable solution for the problem,621
the agent can use this mechanism and decide to accept the other agent’s position or to challenge it with the622
locution why(as, ar, p). Thus, possible outcomes are: send(accept(as, φ)) or send(why(as, ar, φ)).623
• D6 Defend Position: A mechanism that allows an agent to defend its position from a challenge or else, to624
withdraw it. By this mechanism the agent decides if it is able to use its knowledge resources to provide the625
challenger with an argument that supports its position. In that case, it can utter the locution assert(as, ar, arg).626
Otherwise, the agent has to withdraw the position by using the locution noCommit(as, p). Also, the agent that627
put forward the challenge can use this mechanism to listen for the answer to its challenge. The outcomes of628
this mechanism are: send(assert(as, ar, φ)), send(noCommit(as, φ)) or listen().629
• D7 Withdraw Argument: This mechanism allows an agent to decide whether to withdraw an argument that630
it has put forward, using the locution retract(as, ar, φ). Possible outcomes are: send(retract(as, ar, φ)).631
• D8 Withdraw Position: A mechanism that allows an agent to decide whether to withdraw its proposed632
position with the locution noCommit(as, p). The output of this mechanism is: send(noCommit(as, φ)).633
• D9 Accept or Attack: A mechanism that allows an agent to query its knowledge resources and decide to634
accept or attack the argument of other agent. If the argument is consistent with the information inferred635
from the knowledge resources of the agent, it can utter the locution accept(as, ar, arg) to accept the other’s636
argument. Otherwise, if the argument is inconsistent and an attack argument can be generated from the637
knowledge resources, the agent can use this mechanism to decide to attack the argument by uttering the638
locution attack(as, ar, arg). Otherwise, if the argument cannot be decided (there is not enough information in639
the knowledge resources to support or rebut the argument), the agent also accepts it. Thus, possible outcomes640
are: send(accept(as, φ)) or send(attack(as, ar, φ)).641
• D10 Withdraw Attack: This mechanism allows an agent to decide whether to withdraw an attack that it has642
put forward, using the locution retract(as, ar, φ). Possible outcomes are: send(retract(as, ar, φ)) or listen().643
• D11 Rebut Attack: A mechanism that allows an agent to rebut an attack to its argument. By this mech-644
anism, the agent evaluates the attack argument received and queries its knowledge resources to search for645
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information that supports or rebuts the attack. If the attack argument poses a critical question of the type646
presumption, the agent can rebut the attack by showing information that supports its argument with the lo-647
cution assert(as, ar, φ). If the attack argument poses a critical question of the type exception, the agent can648
rebut the attack by challenging it with the locution why(as, ar, φ). Otherwise, if the attack argument poses a649
distinguishing-premise or a counter-example to the agent’s argument, it can use the locution attack(as, ar, arg)650
to rebut the attack by counter-attacking with another distinguishing-premise or counter-example. In any case,651
if the agent is not able to rebut the attack with the information inferred from its knowledge resources, it can652
retract its argument by uttering the locution retract(as, ar, φ). Therefore, the outcomes of this mechanism are:653
send(assert(as, ar, φ)), send(why(as, ar, φ)), send(attack(as, ar, φ)), or send(retract(as, ar, φ)).654
• D12 Defend Argument: This mechanism allows an agent to rebut a challenge to its argument, which poses655
a critical question of the type exception. With this mechanism, the agent queries its knowledge resources656
and tries to find information that supports its attack argument. In that case, the agent can rebut the attack by657
showing this information uttering the locution assert(as, ar, arg). Otherwise, the agent has to withdraw the658
attack by uttering retract(as, ar, arg). Also, the agent that put forward the challenge can use this mechanism659
to listen for the answer to its challenge. Possible outcomes are: send(assert(as, ar, φ)), send(retract(as, ar,660
φ)), or listen().661
• D13 Retract or Attack: This mechanism allows an agent to counter-attack a critical question attack of the662
type exception posed to its argument. With this mechanism, the agent queries its knowledge resources to663
search for information that rebuts the attack. Then, if the agent finds this information, it can counter-attack by664
uttering the locution attack(as, ar, φ). Otherwise, the agent has to withdraw its argument by uttering the lo-665
cution retract(as, ar, φ). Thus, the outcomes of the mechanism are: send(attack(as, ar, φ)) or send(retract(as,666
ar, φ)).667
Table 4 shows the transition rules of the operational semantics of our protocol.668
TR1: 〈as,D1, send(opendialogue(as, φ))〉 L1−→ 〈as,D2, .〉
TR2: 〈as,D2, send(enterdialogue(as, φ))〉 L2−→ 〈as,D3, .〉
TR3: 〈as,D2, send(enterdialogue(as, φ))〉 L2−→ 〈as,D4, .〉
TR4: 〈as,D2, listen()〉 −→ 〈as,D2, .〉
TR5: 〈as,D2, send(closedialogue(as, all, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈all,T, .〉
TR6: 〈as,D3, send(withdrawdialogue(as, φ))〉 L3−→ 〈as,D2, listen()〉
TR7: 〈as,D4, send(propose(as, p))〉 L4−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR8: 〈as,D4, send(propose(as, p))〉 L4−→ 〈as,D5, .〉
TR9: 〈as,D4, send(propose(as, p))〉 L4−→ 〈ar,D5, .〉
TR10: 〈as,D4, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈as,D4, listen()〉
TR11: 〈as,D4, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈ar,D6, .〉
TR12: 〈as,D4, listen()〉 −→ 〈as,D4, .〉
TR13: 〈as,D8, send(noCommit(as, φ))〉 L6−→ 〈as,D4, listen()〉
TR14: 〈as,D8, send(noCommit(as, φ))〉 L6−→ 〈as,D3, .〉
TR15: 〈as,D5, send(accept(as, ar, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈as,D5, .〉
TR16: 〈as,D5, send(accept(as, ar, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈ar,D5, .〉
TR17: 〈as,D5, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈as,D6, listen()〉
TR18: 〈as,D5, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈ar,D6, .〉
TR19: 〈as,D6, listen()〉 −→ 〈as,D6, .〉
TR20: 〈as,D6, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈as,D7, .〉
TR21: 〈as,D6, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
Continues on the next page
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TR22: 〈as,D6, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈ar,D9, .〉
TR23: 〈as,D6, send(noCommit(as, φ))〉 L6−→ 〈as,D3, .〉
TR24: 〈as,D6, send(noCommit(as, φ))〉 L6−→ 〈as,D4, listen()〉
TR25: 〈as,D7, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D6, .〉
TR26: 〈as,D9, send(accept(as, ar, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈as,D3, .〉
TR27: 〈as,D9, send(accept(as, ar, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈as,D5, .〉
TR28: 〈as,D9, send(accept(as, ar, φ))〉 L8−→ 〈ar,D8, .〉
TR29: 〈as,D9, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈as,D10, .〉
TR30: 〈as,D9, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈ar,D8, .〉
TR31: 〈as,D9, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈ar,D11, .〉
TR32: 〈as,D10, listen()〉 −→ 〈as,D10, .〉
TR33: 〈as,D10, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D9, .〉
TR34: 〈as,D10, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈ar,D7, .〉
TR35: 〈as,D10, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈ar,D8, .〉
TR36: 〈as,D11, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈as,D7, .〉
TR37: 〈as,D11, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR38: 〈as,D11, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈ar,D9, .〉
TR39: 〈as,D11, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈as,D12, listen()〉
TR40: 〈as,D11, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈ar,D8, .〉
TR41: 〈as,D11, send(why(as, ar, φ))〉 L5−→ 〈ar,D12, .〉
TR42: 〈as,D11, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈as,D7, .〉
TR43: 〈as,D11, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR44: 〈as,D11, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈ar,D9, .〉
TR45: 〈as,D11, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D6, .〉
TR46: 〈as,D11, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈ar,D6, listen()〉
TR47: 〈as,D12, listen()〉 −→ 〈as,D12, .〉
TR48: 〈as,D12, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR49: 〈as,D12, send(assert(as, ar, φ))〉 L7−→ 〈ar,D13, .〉
TR50: 〈as,D12, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D7, .〉
TR51: 〈as,D12, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR52: 〈as,D12, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈ar,D9, .〉
TR53: 〈as,D13, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈as,D7, .〉
TR54: 〈as,D13, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈as,D8, .〉
TR55: 〈as,D13, send(attack(as, ar, φ))〉 L9−→ 〈ar,D9, .〉
TR56: 〈as,D13, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈as,D6, .〉
TR57: 〈as,D13, send(retract(as, ar, φ))〉 L10−−→ 〈ar,D6, listen()〉
Table 4: Transition Rules of the Dialogue Game Protocol.
These transition rules provide the operational semantics of the dialogue, defining the range of potential decisions669
that agents can make in each stage of the dialogue. In section 5, an example of the water-right transfer scenario is670
provided to illustrate the performance of the dialogue game protocol proposed in this section.671
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4.4. Protocol Evaluation672
There are several ways to evaluate a dialogue game protocol, although there are no standard methods agreed673
by the argumentation in artificial intelligence research community (McBurney and Parsons, 2009). In (Heras674
et al., 2013), we run several experiments to evaluate our argumentation framework by simulating an agreement675
process in a real domain. All experiments were implemented by using our protocol and by using protocols without676
argumentation. This permitted to identify the circumstances under which the use of our argumentation system (and677
implicitly, our dialogue game protocol) produces an improvement on the percentage of times that an agreement is678
reached and the number of agents that is persuaded. In (McBurney et al., 2002) McBurney et al. provided a criteria679
to assess a dialogue game protocol for agent interactions, proposing a set of desiderata that protocols of this type680
should satisfy. These desiderata draw on research in agent interaction, on criteria for assessment of automated681
auction mechanisms, and on elements of argumentation theory and political theory. In this section, we discuss682
that our dialogue game protocol satisfies the desiderata following this approach. Also, by conforming with these683
desiderata, our dialogue game protocol produces outcomes that are Pareto optimal, i.e., that any other outcome684
leaves at least one participant worse off (demonstration available at McBurney02c).685
• Stated Dialogue Purpose: the purpose of the dialogue is to reach an agreement to provide the best solution for686
a problem. All participants are aware of this purpose before they enter in the dialogue. The syntax requires687
the agent that opens the argumentation dialogue to use the locution opendialogue to inform other agents of688
the problem to solve and to ask them to collaborate.689
• Diversity of individual purposes: all agents entering the dialogue can have a different position about the best690
solution for the problem at hand. The protocol also permits agents to enter in the dialogue to express their691
view about other agents’ positions, even if they are not able to provide their own solution. Then, the syntax692
and semantics of the protocol allow agents to defend their individual positions and reach an agreement about693
the best solution to apply.694
• Inclusiveness: agents participating in the agreement process must agree on a set of norms that control the695
behaviour of the society that agents belong. Assuming that agents observe these norms, the protocol allows696
any potential agent that is qualified and willing to participate to engage in the dialogue.697
• Transparency: protocol syntax and semantics are public and available to all participants, so they know the698
rules and structure of the dialectical system prior to commencement of the dialogue.699
• Fairness: locutions, rules and semantics of the protocol are the same for all participants except for the ini-700
tiator of the dialogue, which has the extra responsibilities of starting the dialogue process and conveying the701
information about the final outcome. This is known by the other participants, does not affect its performance702
as dialogue participant, and does not grant this agent any privileges over their partners.703
• Clarity of Argumentation Theory: protocol syntax and semantics conforms to the argumentation theory704
formed by our case-based argumentation framework, the knowledge resources of our framework, and the705
argument ordering established by our defeat relation over arguments (Heras, 2011, Definition 3.5.5). The706
commitment rules of our protocol explicitly establish the commitments associated with each locution and707
how their inclusion in the commitment store affects previous commitments. The rules for the combination708
of locutions define which locution can be put forward at each step of the dialogue game, allowing agents to709
agree on rules of inference and procedure, and have reasonable expectations of the responses of others.710
• Separation of Syntax and Semantics: syntax and semantics are defined separatedly and are publicly available711
to all participants.712
• Rule-Consistency: all protocol rules are consistent with the syntax and semantics.713
• Encouragement of Resolution: the rules for the combination of locutions guide the dialogue to reach an714
agreement over a specific position. Termination rules ensure an outcome of the dialogue and avoid infinite715
loops. However, if the process ends on a disagreement (when agents do no have more positions and arguments716
to put forward, more than one position is still undefeated), agents can use a voting mechanism (selecting the717
position most accepted) or a random selection to decide the final outcome of the dialogue. In addition,718
although a maximum time to reach an agreement can be established, the rules of the protocol ensure that719
prevailing positions at each time are those in which more agents agree upon.720
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• Discouragement of Disruption: termination rules preclude disruptive behaviour, such as uttering the same721
locution to put forward the same argument twice during a dialogue with the same agent (if no new evidences722
have emerged). Also, the rules for the combination of locutions allow agents to withdraw their positions and723
arguments, and to leave the dialogue in an orderly manner.724
• Enablement of Self-Transformation: the locutions of the protocol and the rules for their combination allow725
agents to change their positions and arguments during the dialogue. Agents are able to withdraw positions726
and arguments, retracting from their associated commitments by means of the commitment rules.727
• System Simplicity: the protocol is quite simple, including only 10 locutions and 8 rules for their combination.728
In each stage of the dialogue, only a set of locutions are permitted. Agents take turns to make locutions in729
two-party dialogues, but each agent can hold parallel argumentation dialogues with several participants.730
• Computational Simplicity: the simulation experiments of our argumentation framework presented in (Heras731
et al., 2013) implicitly show that our dialogue game protocol allow agents to reach agreements with a reason-732
able amount of locutions interchanged between them (a total average of less than 40 locutions interchanged733
in a dialogue among 9 agents with more than 30 cases in each agent case-base).734
5. Water-Right Transfer Example735
This section illustrates the dialogue game protocol presented in this paper by means of an example in the water-736
right transfer domain (as introduced in Section 2). In this example, the premises of the domain context would store737
data about the water-right transfer offer and other domain-dependent data about the current problem. For instance,738
as shown in Figure 6 the premises of the original problem could represent the identifier of the water-right owner739
(owner), the offered volume in liters of water (volume), the price in Euros per liter of water (price), the district740
where the water right is settled (district) and the area of this district in acres (area).741
DC1
DC2
F1
F2
POS
F1
POS
F2
Figure 6: Generation of Positions
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After the opening of the trading table by the market facilitator, in the first step of the argumentation process, the742
basin administrator BA opens the dialogue to solve the water-right transfer problem. Thus, it sends the locution743
open dialogue(BA, q) (where q contains the premises of the problem) to all agents of the group, which is the river744
basin RB. Then, the BA enters in the dialogue by putting forward the locution enter dialogue(BA, q). Figure 7745
shows the sequence of locutions interchanged by the agents during the dialogue.746
F1 BA F2
open_dialogue(BA, q)open_dialogue(BA, q)
enter_dialogue(BA, q)enter_dialogue(BA, q)
enter_dialogue(F1, q)
enter_dialogue(F1, q)
enter_dialogue(F2, q)
enter_dialogue(F2, q)
propose(F1, posF1)
propose(F1, posF1)
propose(F2, posF2)
propose(F2, posF2)
why(BA, F1, posF1) why(BA, F2, posF2)
assert(F1, BA, SAF1)
assert(F2, BA, SAF2)
attack(BA, F1, AA1)
noCommit(F1, posF1)
accept(BA, all, posF2)accept(BA, all, posF2)
Figure 7: Sequence of Locutions
Assuming that both farmers F1 and F2 are interested in entering in the dialogue and arguing to win the transfer,747
they will assert the locutions enter dialogue(F1, q) and enter dialogue(F2, q), respectively. After that, they will748
search for domain-cases in their case-bases (DC1 and DC2, respectively) to generate their potential positions. To749
query the case-bases, the problem is formatted as a target case without solution and justification, as shown on750
the left side of Figure 6. In this case, the solution consists of the identifier of the water-right transfer beneficiary751
(beneficiary) and the district of the land where the water has to be transferred (tr district). Figure 6 also shows752
how F1 has found a similar domain-case C1 that represents a similar water-right transfer that was granted to F1753
to promote economy since its land DF1 was adjacent (closer than 100 meters) to the land where the water right754
was offered. Therefore, F1 can generate position posF1 which is on the side of F19 and report this to the other755
participants of the dialogue with the locution propose(F1, posF1).756
In the case of F2, the figure shows that it has also retrieved a similar domain-case C2, which shows how the same757
water-right transfer was granted to F2 to promote solidarity and irrigate the dry land during a drought. Therefore,758
F2 can generate a position that is on its favour, posF2, and it will communicate this by putting forward the locution759
propose(F2, posF2).760
9In this example, we assume that agents only propose the positions that are on their favour.
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Once the agents have proposed their positions, the basin administrator BA has to decide between them. There-761
fore, it asks F1 and F2 to provide an argument to support their positions by using the locutions why(BA, F1,762
posF1) and why(BA, F2, posF2). Assuming that F1 and F2 are willing to collaborate, they can answer the BA with763
the locutions to put forward the following arguments (in accordance with the structure proposed in (Heras, 2011,764
Chapter 4)):765
Supporting argument of F1 (with the locution assert(F1, BA, SAF1)):766
S AF1 == {F1tr, EC, {Premises, {C1}, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅}}767
Supporting argument of F2 (with the locution assert(F2, BA, SAF2)):768
S AF2 = {F2tr, S O, {Premises, {C2}, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅}}769
where the support set includes the premises of the problem description and the domain-cases used by F1 (C1) and770
F2 (C2) to generate their positions. F1tr and F2tr mean that the transfer is granted to F1 and F2, respectively. In771
accordance with the values of the agents, we assume that the closer the lands are the cheaper the transfers between772
them are and then S AF1 would promote economy. We also assume that crops on dry lands are lost and that helping773
people to avoid losing crops promotes solidarity. Thus, S AF2 would promote solidarity.774
Now, the BA has to evaluate the arguments of F1 and F2, attack them if possible, and decide the beneficiary of775
the water-right transfer. Also, let us assume that, as basin administrator, BA knows an extra premise that states that776
there is a drought in the basin. First, this new premise matches an argumentation scheme of its ontology, S 1, which777
changes the value preference order of the basin in case of drought (such as the argumentation scheme shown in778
section 3). Thus, this scheme will change the social context of the attack argument that the BA is going to create.779
Since the support set of S AF1 and S AF2 contains a domain-case, the BA will try to propose a counter-example or780
a distinguishing premise for these cases.781
BA
Domain-cases
DC
AA1
AA2
Figure 8: Counter-examples for C1 and C2
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Thus, the BA will check its case-base of domain-cases (DC) to find counter-examples for C1 and C2. As shown782
in Figure 8, suppose that the BA finds one counter-example for each case (C3 for C1 and C4 for C2). Thus, it783
could generate the following attack arguments by using the locutions:784
attack(BA, F1, AA1), where AA1 = {∼C1, SO, {Premises ∪ {Drought}, ∅, ∅, S1, ∅, ∅, ∅, {C3}}}785
Here, AA1 undercuts S AF1 by attacking its support element C1 with the counter-example C3. We assume that by786
attacking the argument of F1, the BA supports the argument of F2 and then promotes solidarity (SO):787
attack(BA, F2, AA2), where AA2 = {∼C2, EC, {Premises ∪ {Drought}, ∅, ∅, S1, ∅, ∅, ∅, {C4}}}788
AA2 undercuts S AF2 by attacking its support element C2 with the counter-example C4. Here we assume that by789
attacking the argument of F2, the BA supports the argument of F1 and then promotes economy (EC).790
Then, the BA will try to find distinguishing premises and will check that the problem description of domain-791
cases C1 and C2 matches the extended description of the problem (the original description plus the new premise792
drought). Then, the BA realises that C1 does not match the extended description and generates an attack argument793
to F1:794
attack(BA, F1, AA3), where AA3 = {∼C1, SO, {Premises ∪ {Drought}, ∅, ∅, S1, ∅, {Drought}, ∅, ∅}}795
In this case, AA3 undercuts S AF1 by attacking its supporting element C1 with the distinguishing premise drought.796
Again, we assume that by attacking the argument of F1, the BA supports the argument of F2 and then promotes797
solidarity (SO).798
Now, the BA has to select the argument that it will pose to attack the positions of the farmers. Note that, if we799
assume that agents always observe their value preference orders to put forward arguments, the BA would prefer800
to pose AA1 and AA3 first than AA2 (since the BA has the value preference order of the basin, which has been801
changed to EC <S tRB J <
S t
RB S O). However, the BA still has to decide which argument (AA1 or AA3) it would802
select to attack S AF1. To do that, BA generates an argument-case for each argument and checks its case-base803
of argument-cases to decide which one is the best argument to pose in view of previous experience. Now, let us804
suppose that the BA finds a similar argument-case for AA3 that was unaccepted at the end of the dialogue (such as805
the one shown in Table 2 of section 3). However, the information of the group that the agents belong to does not806
match the current information. Therefore, the BA can infer that, in the argument represented by this argument-case,807
the agents belonged to a different river basin where solidarity is not promoted in case of drought. Finally, the BA808
finds a similar argument-case for AA1 that was accepted in the past. In this case, the social context and the value809
promoted match the current one. Thus, the BA will pose AA1 to attack the position of F1 and put forward the810
locution attack(BA, F1, AA1). Note that if the social context of the argument-case retrieved for AA3 had matched811
the current social context, the basin administrator would have a powerful reason to propose AA1 to attack S AF1.812
Also, the BA would never propose AA3 as an alternative candidate if AA1 were rejected.813
When F1 receives the attack, it has to evaluate the attack argument in view of its preferences and knowl-814
edge resources and the dependency relations of the society. Then, it will realise that S AF1 does not defeat815
AA1 from its point of view, since the BA has a power dependency relation with every farmer (Farmer <S tPower816
Basin Administrator). Then, it would try to generate more support for its position. If F1 cannot find such support,817
it would have to withdraw posF1 with the locution noCommit(F1, posF1). If no more positions and arguments818
are provided, the BA will close the dialogue and send the locution accept(BA, all, posF2), which grants F2 the819
water-right transfer agreement.820
Although the example in this section presents a simple dialogue between agents, it clearly demonstrates how821
agents’ arguments can be managed and interchanged by using our dialogue game protocol. The following section822
discusses related work.823
6. Related Work824
Dialogue games have been used for multiple purposes in computational linguistics, AI (Bench-Capon, 1998),825
and philosophy (specifically in argumentation theory (Hamblin, 1970)(MacKenzie, 1979)). In CBR systems, they826
have been applied to model human reasoning about legal precedents (Prakken and Sartor, 1998). In MAS, their827
more successful application consists of using them as a tool for the specification of communication protocols828
between agents. Thus, we can find abundant bibliography that formalises agent interaction protocols by using829
different dialogue games (Amgoud et al., 2000)(Maudet and Chaib-draa, 2002). Some other examples of dialogue830
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game protocols about specific types of dialogues are: information seeking (Hulstijn, 2000), persuasion (Prakken831
and Sartor, 1998)(Atkinson, 2005)(Wardeh et al., 2008), negotiation (Sadri et al., 2001)(Karunatillake et al., 2009),832
inquiry (McBurney and Parsons, 2001), and deliberation (McBurney et al., 2007). In contrast, in the protocol833
presented this work we do not focus on a specific type of dialogue; instead, we have proposed a generic dialogue834
game that can be used in deliberative, persuasive, or negotiation dialogues where a group of agents must reach an835
agreement about the solution to apply to a generic problem of any type (e.g., resource allocation, classification,836
prediction, etc.) that could be described with a set of features. Furthermore, to our knowledge no research has been837
done to propose a dialogue game that is based on case-based knowledge resources that agents can use to manage838
agreement processes in agent societies. All of these works rely on rule-based frameworks, with limitted application839
in open MAS for real domains due to the need of eliciting a previous model of the domain, as explained in section840
1.841
A particular element of dialogue games, commitment stores, has been widely used in the area of MAS. The842
fact that an agent utters a certain proposition during the dialogue means that this agent incurs a certain level843
of commitment to this proposition and its implications or, at least, that the agent has certain support to justify844
this utterance. The concept of commitment stores comes from the study of fallacies (poor reasoning patterns845
that in some way imitate valid reasoning patterns) developed by Hamblin in (Hamblin, 1970). According to this846
work, formal reasoning systems have public commitment stores for each participant, whose commitments can be847
withdrawn under certain circumstances. The inclusion of a new commitment gives rise to a previous verification848
that guarantees the coherence of the information of the store. Following Hamblin’s approach, commitments have849
a purely dialogical processing (he calls them propositional commitments) and are associated to beliefs that do not850
necessary correspond with the actual beliefs of the participant. Furthermore, commitments may not hold outside851
of the dialogue context. In this work, we use the concept of dialogue games to model the interaction between852
the agents that belong to a society. In doing so, we assume that the commitments that the agents make during the853
dialogue are stored in commitment stores that are fully accessible to their owner and partially accessible to the other854
participants of the dialogue. In this sense, on the contrary to Hamblin’s approach, our commitment stores are not855
completely public in order to preserve the privacy of the arguments interchanged in two-party dialogues between856
a pair of agents. However, we also endorse the view of Hamblin on the notion of commitments as propositional857
commitments that agents incur during the dialogue, with no effect once the dialogue is terminated.858
Another approach for the concept of commitment was provided by Walton and Krabbe in (Walton and Krabbe,859
1995). In this work, commitments are understood as obligations of participants to incur, maintain, or execute a860
certain course of action (they are action commitments). In this case, the commitments made during the dialogue can861
force the participants to perform certain actions outside of the dialogue context. For these authors, commitments862
can also represent the fact of uttering statements in the dialogue. Therefore, propositional commitments are viewed863
as a specific type of action commitments. In our work, we do not consider commitments once the dialogue finishes864
and the contents of commitment stores are deleted at the end of each dialogue.865
Finally, a different approach for commitments was presented by Singh in (Singh, 2000), who proposes a social866
semantics for agent communication languages. According to Singh, the participants of the dialogue have to express867
their social commitments. These commitments represent public expressions of their mental states, for example868
their beliefs about certain propositions and their intentions to execute actions in the future, which are relevant to869
the dialogue. Therefore, by observing these expressions, locutions in the dialogue can be linked to the mental870
states of agents. In this work, agents have a partial view of the information and locutions conveyed in the dialogue.871
As pointed out in section 4 each agent has a full view of the commitment store of the other agent engaged with it872
in a two-party dialogue, but the rest of agents can only see the positions proposed by these agents in the dialogue,873
but not the arguments that they interchange. This preserves the privacy of the arguments that an agent puts forward874
in its argumentation dialogue with another agent. In addition, Singh’s work assumes that agents are cooperative875
and honest and do not make expressions to falsely represent its mental states willfully. In our work, we cannot876
make such assumptions, since they are unrealistic to model open MAS. Our agents are able to make proposals at877
their convenience and they have to justify them only if requested. In that case, we acknowledge that we do not878
preclude agents to show false pieces of evidence to support their positions and arguments. Then, we assume that879
the normative level of the system includes norms to punish such violations of the global good of the society.880
Despite the prolific applications of dialogue games in MAS, as discussed by Maudet in (Maudet and Evrard,881
1998), a commonly accepted theory of dialogue games that is generic and suitable for any type of dialogue does not882
yet exist. However, there is a common set of requirements among the models based on dialogue games that defines883
their syntax. In the literature, we can find two main approaches for the syntactic definition of dialogue games. On884
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the one hand, the work in (McBurney and Parsons, 2002a), which is based on Maudet’s requirements, proposes885
a definition for the components that a dialogue game should have. On the other hand, a different view of the886
elements of dialogue games is presented in (Prakken and Sartor, 1998). The approach of McBurney and Parsons is887
prospective (looking forward to model systems that do not yet exist). Opposite to this proposal, Prakken’s approach888
is retrospective (looking back to reconstruct or explain what happened in a dialogue). Therefore, McBurney and889
Parson’s approach can be considered as more suitable for modelling the dialogue between a set of heterogeneous890
agents whose interactions will determine the dynamics and operation of the system. Therefore, we have followed891
this approach in our work. By contrast, Prakken’s approach assumes a presupposed knowledge about the domain892
that remains inalterable throughout the dialogue. However, in open MAS, the context can also be changed as new893
agents enter in the system and new common knowledge is available.894
Together with the definition of the syntax, a definition of semantics must be specified to provide a formal895
definition of the dialogue game. This semantics is concerned with the truth on falsity of utterances. There are896
different types of semantics for agent communication protocols and dialogue games (van Eijk, 2002). One type of897
semantics, the axiomatic semantics, defines each locution of the protocol in terms of the pre-conditions that must898
exist before the locution can be uttered and the post-conditions that apply after its utterance. Axiomatic semantics899
can be public or private (McBurney, 2002). In the public one, the pre-conditions and post-conditions describe900
states or conditions of the dialogue that are publicly observable by all its participants, whereas in the private one901
some pre-conditions or post-conditions describe states or conditions of the dialogue that are only observable by902
some participants. Another type of semantics is called operational semantics. This semantics views the dialogue903
game protocol as an abstract state machine and precisely defines the transitions between states. The transitions904
are triggered by the utterance of each locution. The dialogue game proposed in this paper has been formalised by905
specifying its operational semantics, which provides an intuitive view of the protocol dynamics. Nevertheless, the906
axiomatic semantics of the protocol has also been defined and can be consulted in (Heras, 2011, Chapter 4).907
In a third type of semantics, denotational semantics, each element of the language syntax is assigned a rela-908
tionship to an abstract mathematical entity (its denotation). The possible worlds of Kripke (Kripke, 1959) is an909
example of such a semantics. Finally, there is a specific type of denotational semantics, the game-theoretic se-910
mantics, where each well-formed statement of the language is associated with a conceptual game between two911
players, a protagonist and an antagonist. A statement is considered to be true if there is a winning strategy for the912
protagonist in the associated game (a rule that gives that player moves such that executing them guarantees the913
player can win the game, no matter what moves are made by the antagonist).914
Game-theoretical semantics are usually applied to abstract argumentation frameworks where the strategies of915
agents determine which argument(s) they will reveal in each argumentation step. However, they assume the ex-916
istence of a pre-defined utility function about the payoff that an agent obtains for winning the dialogue or having917
accepted more or fewer arguments. Game theory assumes complete knowledge of the space of arguments proposed918
in the argumentation framework. There is a large body of literature on mechanism design and game-theoretical919
models of argumentation (mainly negotiation) in MAS (Rahwan and Reed, 2009). These approaches are typically920
concerned with the problem of designing mechanisms that provide rewards to individual agents to adopt a cer-921
tain negotiation strategy. However, opposite to our work, these approaches do not analyse how agents take into922
account their preferences over values and their dependency relations to manage argumentation dialogues. In ad-923
dition, game-theoretical assumptions are unrealistic in an argumentation dialogue between heterogeneous agents924
that have individual and private knowledge resources to generate arguments, which is our case.925
7. Conclusions926
This paper has presented a dialogue game protocol that agents of a case-based argumentation framework can927
use to interact and engage in argumentation dialogues. The protocol advances research in the investigation of928
dialectical systems for MAS in the sense that it provides agents with a formalised and structured way of arguing929
taking into account their social context. The syntax of the protocol has been detailed by defining its locutions,930
commencement rules, rules for the combination of locutions, commitment rules, rules for the speaker order, and931
termination rules. The operational semantics of the locutions are defined. This semantics views each locution as a932
transition in an abstract state-machine that represents the possible stages that can be reached during the dialogue.933
This work has introduced a running example that motivates the need for a dialogue protocol that controls agree-934
ment processes in agent societies and takes into account the social context of agents. A specific dialogue in this935
scenario has also been presented. This water-right transfer domain is complex enough to be used to illustrate the936
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performance of the protocol. However, many water-right transfers are usually agreed upon by the water users,937
without any recording of the terms and outcome of the agreement. Therefore, due to this fact and due to restric-938
tive privacy laws to access this type of data, the actual implementation of the system in this domain still remains939
to be done in future work. Nevertheless, during this project we have elicited the knowledge of experts from the940
water market domain to design the protocol. In addition, our framework has been implemented as an argumenta-941
tion API in the Magentix2 agent platform and in (Heras et al., 2013), we run several experiments to evaluate our942
argumentation framework by simulating an agreement process in a real domain.943
In this work we have assumed that a proponent agent addresses its arguments to an opponent of its same group,944
having complete knowledge of the opponents’ social context. However, in real systems, some features of argument-945
cases could be unknown. For instance, the proponent of an argument obviously knows its value preferences and946
probably knows the preferences of its group, however, in a real open MAS, it is unlikely that the opponent’s value947
preferences are known. Nevertheless, the proponent might know the value preferences of the opponent’s group or948
have some previous knowledge about the value preferences of similar agents playing the same role as the opponent.949
If agents belong to different groups, the group features may be unknown, but the proponent could use its experience950
with other agents of the opponent’s group and infer them. Therefore, many interesting questions on how to infer951
the opponents’ social context remain to be studied as future work. A battery of tests to evaluate the influence of952
the knowledge that an agent has about the social context of its opponents on the performance of the system was953
developed and analysed in (Heras, 2011, Chapter 6). Even though the framework is flexible enough to cope with954
this lack of knowledge, the reliability of the conclusions drawn from previous experience would not be as good.955
Furthermore, the features of the proponent or the opponent could represent information about agents that act956
as representatives of a group and any agent can belong to different groups at the same time. In addition, the957
argumentation dialogue is centralised by the basin administrator and agents do not speak to each other directly;958
however the basin administrator could use the information provided by an agent to attack the arguments of another959
agent. Nevertheless, our protocol is conceived to serve for both mediated and face-to-face argumentation dialogues.960
Also for simplicity, the example does not show how agents can use the dialogue graphs associated to argument-961
cases to take strategic decisions about which arguments are more suitable in a specific situation or about whether962
continuing with a current argumentation dialogue is worth. Tackling doing strategies in argumentation dialogues is963
a complex problem that we are dealing with in current research. For instance, to improve efficiency in a negotiation964
an argumentation dialogue could be terminated if it were similar to a previous one that didn’t reach an agreement.965
Otherwise, opponent moves in a dialogue could be inferred by looking at a similar previous dialogue with the same966
opponent.967
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